I want to bring into the discussion this paper that was released quite recently:
Abstract
- “This paper offers a counter-proof to this claim, formally proving the existence of a
mechanism that achieves sybil-proofness in a three-hop path.”
Conclusion
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“The routing-tax mechanism described in this paper fixes the sybilling problem by inverting the collective action problem that creates the incentive to sybil in the first place.”
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“With this in mind, we close by returning readers to the assumption made in Part 1 that users desiring sybil-free transactions will forward their transactions to two different first-hop nodes.”
Zenon Whitepaper
Section V
B. PoW links
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“In this subsection, we will introduce a novel anti-sybil and anti-spam mechanism called proof of work links that will enhance connectivity within the network and limit certain attacks by sharing their commitment and contributing resources for routing and efficient data delivery.”
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“… a minimum number of three hops is required by a min relay dimension constant, and an upper bound will be dynamically imposed by a difficulty parameter. The proof of work will be calculated with respect to the transaction fee paid by the user to issue the transaction.”
I’m still gathering puzzle pieces for Network of Momentum Phase 1.